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Abstract—Privacy-preserving machine learning is learning
from sensitive datasets that are typically distributed across
multiple data owners. Private machine learning is a remarkable
challenge in a large number of realistic scenarios where no
trusted third party can play the role of a mediator. The strong
decentralization aspect of these scenarios requires tools from
cryptography as well as from distributed systems communities.
In this paper, we present a practical scheme that is suitable
for a subclass of machine learning algorithms and investigate
the possibility of conducting future research. We present a
scheme to learn a linear least squares model across two parties
using a gradient descent approach and additive homomorphic
encryption. The protocol requires two rounds of communication
per step of gradient descent. We detail our approach including
a fixed point encoding scheme, and one time random pads for
hiding intermediate results.
Index Terms—Machine Learning, Privacy, Least Squares, Lin-
ear Regression, Homomorphic Encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
Private machine learning is driven by trust issues in cloud
computing. The cloud unlocks unprecedented opportunities for
outsourcing of storage and computation. It offers flexibility,
scalability and cost saving, but the risk of being exposed to
privacy and security issues retains a lot of customers from
risking their sensitive data to the cloud. Recent research fo-
cuses on leveraging cryptographic techniques to enable secure
outsourcing of computation to the cloud. Different approaches
have been proposed to assimilate this challenge, some of them
are based on differential privacy, some others are tailored from
homomorphic encryption, and some consider the problem as
a special case of secure multi-party computation and secure
function evaluation.
A cryptosystem which supports both addition and multipli-
cation (thereby preserving the ring structure of the plaintexts)
is known as Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). FHE
effectively allows the construction of programs which may be
run on encryptions of their inputs to produce an encryption of
their output. Since such a program never decrypts its input, it
can be run by an untrusted party without revealing its inputs
and internal state. This would have great practical implications
in the outsourcing of or multi-party secure computation.
Gentry describes a solution to fully homomorphic encryp-
tion based on Lattice cryptography [1]. Unfortunately it is
estimated that performing a Google search with encrypted
keywords would increase the amount of computing time by
about a factor of trillion. This has been later improved through
several optimizations. Currently, HELib (https://github.com/
shaih/HElib) evaluates the arithmetic circuit of an AES-128
block in around 2 seconds, amortized time.
Somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) schemes, which
support a limited number of homomorphic operations, can
be much faster, and more compact than fully homomorphic
encryption ones. Nevertheless, noise grows exponentially with
respect to the number of levels of multiplications performed.
Bootstrapping, a very costly procedure, is then necessary to
reduce the noise to its initial level. Leveled homomorphic
encryption (LHE) allows evaluation of polynomial functions
of a bounded degree without resorting to bootstrapping.
Partially homomorphic cryptosystems are simpler and sup-
port only one kind of computation (e.g. addition, multipli-
cation, XOR). However they are more practical in terms of
performance and have a wide range of applications ranging
from secure voting and collision resistant hash functions to
private information retrieval and secure computation on the
cloud. Following the seminal work of Atallah et. al. [2], we
use Paillier’s additive homomorphic encryption [3] to provide
a practical solution for several secure distributed learning prob-
lems. We focus on a subclass of machine learning algorithms
called D-polynomial as per the definition in [4]. We consider
in particular two-party private linear least squares and linear
regression. The proposed schemes can be extended to the
multi-party scenario. Figure 1 shows two solutions for linear
regression based on data incoming from two parties: Bob and
Alice. The first solution is the exact solution, while the second
is based on the method of gradient descent. However, the
gradient descent converges to the exact solution if we iterate
long enough and choose a small enough learning rate. The goal
of this paper is to let the two parties compute the solution to
any linear least squares under privacy constraints by the means
of a distributed gradient descent protocol.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
summarizes related word. We present background information
about linear least squares in Section III. Section IV presents a
summary of the homomorphic cryptosystem that we are using,
problem formulation and threat model. We propose the private
machine learning protocol in Section V. We discuss simulation
results and implementation choices in Section VI and conclude
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Fig. 1. Two-Party Linear Regression: Exact vs. Gradient Descent Solutions
the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
We divide related work into two categories:
• Work that addresses secure outsourcing of computation.
This work stresses on the asymmetry of computation
workload. In other words, computationally weak clients
are the owners of the data and want to outsource their data
processing tasks to a computationally strong server. This
work is more suitable for the context of cloud computing.
The survey in [5] distinguishes between two different
applications:
– Fundamental functions such as scalar operations, e.g.
Exponentiation modulo a large integer for RFID
tags [6], matrix operations [7] and mathematical
optimization [8].
– Application-oriented procedures such as machine
learning [4], image processing [9], and biometric
authentication [10]
• The second category, like in this paper, addresses multi-
party secure function evaluation. We are especially inter-
ested in machine learning functions. Given m instances
in Rn, their categorical or numerical labels in Y and an
unlabeled instance in Rn, the function outputs a label in
Y:
A : (Rn × Y)m × Rn → Y
In this context, the data is split horizontally or vertically
in between different parties. The different parties are
willing to learn a machine learning model over the overall
data set without unveiling their owned data parts. We put
in this category the work in [11], [12], [13] and [14]
We also can categorize related work based on the privacy
preserving strategy in question:
• work that are based on cryptography, data encryption
using homomorphic encryption or Yao’s garbled circuits
[15]. Our paper falls in this category;
• and work based on data anonymization by adding special
types of statistical noise to the data, such as in differential
privacy. [16].
In [4], leveled homomorphic encryption scheme is proposed
to delegate the execution of a machine learning algorithm
to a computing service while retaining confidentiality of the
training and test data. Since the computational complexity of
the homomorphic encryption scheme depends primarily on the
number of levels of multiplications to be carried out on the
encrypted data, a new class of machine learning algorithms
is defined in which the algorithms predictions, viewed as
functions of the input data, can be expressed as polynomials
of bounded degree. For instance, comparison and division are
not polynomial. We take linear means classifier as an example
to depict their methodolgy. The linear means classifier defines
a hyperplane midway on and orthogonal to the line through
the two class-conditional means. This can be derived as the
Bayes optimal decision boundary in the case that the two class-
conditional distributions have identical isotropic distributions.
Formally, the classification model is defined by a vector θ and
an offset c.
θ =M1 −M2
c = θT
(M1 +M2)
2
where M1 = S1m1 is the mean of all vectors belonging to C1
and M2 = S2m2 is the mean of all vectors belonging to C2. m1
and m2 are the respective count of sets C1 and C2. S1 and
S2 are their respective vectors sum.
The prediction of a new vector x depends on the sign of
the score function A(θ, c, x) = θTx − c, if positive the class
is class1 and if negative the class is class2.
A division-free form of the same prediction can be obtained
through multiplication by 2m21m
2
2:
Adivsion-free(θ, c, x) = 2m
2
1m
2
2(
ST1
m1
− S
T
2
m2
)(x− S1
2m1
− S2
2m2
)
= (m2S
T
1 −m1ST2 )(m1m2x−m2S1 −m1S2)
Linear means classifiers (θTx − c = 0) is 2-Polynomial
because c is a quadratic function in terms of the training
data vector. Division-free integer algorithms are proposed as
approximations to solve binary classification and least-squares
using a small number of gradient descent steps. We follow a
very similar approach in this paper, although our schemes only
use PHE without recurring to LHE.
An interesting approach for practical secure aggregation
with the goal of private machine learning is proposed in [17].
A distributed system with crash node failures and malicious
node failures is presented. Distributed systems protocols are
designed to allow collecting and computing the sum of large,
user-held data vectors incoming from mobile devices at a
central server without the server learning individual users
contribution. The individual users contributions are protected
using one-time masking pads. The collected data can be used
in a federated learning setting, to train a deep neural network.
We also use one time masking pads in this paper.
SMC Implementations
Several frameworks are proposed in the literature for im-
plementing secure multi-party computation. The most impor-
tant ones are Obliv-C, ObliVM, SPDZ and Sharemind [18].
Obliv-C (https://oblivc.org) implements Yao’s Garbled Cir-
cuits and other techniques in a C-compatible domain specific
language. Obliv-C achieves minimalism and expressiveness
through a few additional keywords to the C language such
as obliv and oblivious functions (e.g. feedOblivInt(),
revealOblivInt()). The authors report a raw speed
of 3M+ AND gates per second. ObliVM (http://oblivm.
com) follows the same philosophy and its language has
a Java/C++ style. It reports 700K AND gates per second
or 1.8M with preprocessing. More interesting to our ap-
proach is SPDZ (http://www.bris.ac.uk/engineering/research/
cryptography/resources/spdz-software/) which support SHE
and linear secret sharing. It does not have a domain specific
language but can be programmed via Python library calls. It re-
ports speeds in the range from 4800 multiplications/second for
two parties in the offline phase to 358K multiplications/second
for two parties in the online phase. Finally Sharemind (https:
//sharemind.cyber.ee) is a commercial application Platform but
available for researchers. Its style is similar to Java or .NET
and has unique features such as vector optimization. We are
to evaluate these tools for experimenting with private machine
learning in general and our proposed protocols in particular.
III. BACKGROUND ON LINEAR LEAST SQUARES
We start by recalling essential background information on
linear least squares.
In least squares (and linear regression in particular), we have
a number m of data items represented in a n dimensional
space. The data items form a long and skinny m × n matrix
X and their corresponding values form a vector Y ∈ Rm. We
assume that X has a full column rank. In the over-determined
case m > n, there is typically no vector θ ∈ Rn satisfying
Xθ = Y .
A. Normal equations
We aim to find a vector θ that minimizes the loss function
J = 12 ||Xθ − y||2. Let’s first compute the gradient of J with
respect to θ:
J(θ) =
1
2
‖Xθ − y‖2
=
1
2
(Xθ − y)T (Xθ − y)
=
1
2
(θTXT − yT )(Xθ − y)
=
1
2
(θTXTXθ − 2yTXθ + yT y)
Taking the gradient with respect to θ gives:
∂J(θ)
∂θ
= XTXθ −XT y
The minimum can be found directly by solving the system of
so-called normal equations XTXθ −XT y = 0:
θ = (XTX)−1XT y
However, we cannot afford the matrix inversion and the matrix
multiplications under encryption. We solve for θ using a
gradient descent method as described next.
B. Gradient descent
The gradient descent method consists on starting from a
random guess of θ, say θ0 (where values are usually chosen
small), and consecutively update θ through many iterations.
Each update walks a small step as controlled by a learning
rate parameter α where 0 < α < 1, in the opposite direction
of the gradient of the loss function.
The formula to update the vector θ is as follows:
θi+1 = θi − (α/m)(XT (Xθ − y))
IV. PARTIALLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
There is no universal method to create a protocol for
secure multi-party computation. Several homomorphic sys-
tems only support a subset of mathematical operations, like
addition (Paillier, Benaloh), multiplication (ElGamal, RSA),
or exclusive-or (Goldwasser and Micali). From a security per-
spective, only the additive Paillier and the multiplicative ElGa-
mal are classified to be IND-CPA (stands for indistinguishabil-
ity under chosen plaintext attack) [19]. Partially homomorphic
cryptosystems are more desirable from a performance point
of view than somewhat homomorphic cryptosystems, which
support a limited operation depth.
A. Paillier’s cryptosystem
We use Paillier’s homomorphic cryptosystem [3] that pos-
sesses the following properties:
(i) It’s a public key scheme, which means encryption can be
performed by anyone who knows the public key, whereas
decryption can only be done by the matching private key,
known only to a trusted party.
(ii) It is probabilistic. In other words, it is impossible for an
adversary to tell whether two ciphertexts are encryptions
of the same plaintext or not.
(iii) It possesses the homomorphic properties for addition, in
particular:
Epk[(m1 +m2) mod Npk] ≡ Epk[m1]Epk[m2] mod N2pk
(1)
Epk[(a.m1) mod Npk] ≡ Epk[m1]a mod N2pk (2)
Where Npk = pq is part of the public key. We can build
operations over matrices and vectors on top of these properties:
• addition of two matrices (or vectors) under encryption,
• matrix multiplication of an encrypted matrix or vector by
a plaintext matrix or vector.
B. Problem Formulation and Threat Model
Our threat model is ”honest but curious”, or as often called
”semi-honest”. We assume that the parties run the protocol
exactly as specified, therefore we do not assume any deviation
from the protocol, malicious or other. However, the parties
may try to learn as much as possible about the input of the
other party from their views of the protocol exchanged data.
Hence, we want the view of each party not to leak more
knowledge than the prior knowledge, as formally expressed
in the following definition:
Definition 1. A pair of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing
machines (P1, P2) is a secure 2-party protocol (for static,
semi-honest adversaries) for a deterministic polynomial time-
computable function f if the following properties hold:
• Completeness: for all i ∈ {1, 2} and inputs x1, x2 ∈
{0, 1}∗, we have (with probability 1):
outPi [P1(x1)↔ P2(x2)] = f(x1, x2)
• Privacy: there exist non-uniform probabilistic
polynomial-time simulators S1,S2 such that for all
x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}∗ and all i ∈ {0, 1}:
viewPi [P1(x1)↔ P2(x2)]
c≈ Si(xi, f(x1, x2))
To cope with the practical aspects of Definition 1 we derive
the following property that we call “safe exposure”:
Property 1. A data item xi that belongs to a party Pi has a
“safe exposure” during and following a protocol run if it is
not exposed to any other party, except through one of these
three means:
• the item is encrypted using partially homomorphic en-
cryption, the private key of which belongs to the owner
party Pi.
• the item is added to a securely generated random number
R and exposed as X +R where R is only known to the
owner party Pi.
• the item is used in a proved secure multi-party computa-
tion, particularly a garbled-circuits based protocol.
An alternative and equivalent definition can be expressed as
follows:
Definition 2. A two-party protocol is secure with respect to
a problem definition, if the safe exposure property if enforced
for all tuples (xi, Pi) where data item xi is required to be
private to party Pi in the problem definition.
V. PRIVACY PRESERVING PROTOCOLS
Bob and Alice want to learn a model of their respective
data sets using gradient descent while preserving the privacy
of their data. Bob has one part of the data X1 of cardinal m1
and labels Y1 and Alice has another part X2 of cardinal m2
and labels Y2. The concatenation of their data is X . Each row
of X represents the feature vector of one data item belonging
to Alice or Bob. In the setup phase, Bob and Alice exchange
their public keys for Paillier’s homomorphic encryption given
a security parameter λ. Bob and Alice negotiate values for the
learning rate α, number of iterations to run N and the starting
value θ0. They also compute the total number of instances m
as shown in Figure 2.
To solve the problem of linear least squares we use the
gradient descent method. Basically it consists on initializing
a random vector θ0 with random values (usually  1), a
learning rate α, then run a sufficient number of iterations N
to successively move θ a small step in the opposite direction
of the gradient. The update formula is as follows:
θ1 = θ0 − (α/m)(XTXθ0 −XTY )
where X is the feature matrix of dimension m× n, m is the
number of data items and n is the number of features. In the
case of linear regression n−1 is the degree of the polynomial
representing the solution of the least squares optimization.
In the two-party model, the matrix X is composed of two
parts: X1 is Bob’s data and X2 is Alice’s data.
X =
(
X1
X2
)
Y =
(
Y1
Y2
)
XTX =
(
XT1 X
T
2
)( X1
X2
)
= XT1 X1 +X
T
2 X2
XTY =
(
XT1 X
T
2
)( Y1
Y2
)
= XT1 Y1 +X
T
2 Y2
Note that Bob can compute XT1 X1 and X
T
1 Y1, and Alice can
compute XT2 X2 and X
T
2 Y2 independently and without any
data transfer.
Bob and Alice agree on a fixed point representation to en-
code real numbers into integers (since our encryption scheme
only works with integers). We choose a scaling factor s > 0
in function of the fractional digits needed. A real number r is
mapped into an integer t as follows:
t = round(r ∗ 10s)
The decoding of t is the inverse operation yielding r′:
r′ = t ∗ 10−s
Therefore the absolute encoding error is
|r′ − r| < 10
−s
2
To encode XTXθ0−XTY , we choose different encoding for
elements of X , Y and θ. If we encode elements of X with
a scaling factor s1, the elements of θ with a scaling factor
s2, then the elements of the matrix multiplication XTXθ0 is
encoded with a scaling factor 2s1 + s2. To have the same
encoding for XTY , elements of Y must be encoded with a
scaling factor s1+s2. The result XTXθ0−XTY has a scaling
factor of 2s1 + s2. Based on this scheme, we use the terms
’encrypt’ and ’decrypt’ as shorts for ’encode and encrypt’, and
Setup
Bob Alice
X1, Y1 X2, Y2
Negotiate values of θ0, N and α
m = m1 +m2
(pkPaillierBob , sk
Paillier
Bob )←$KGen(1λ) (pkPaillierAlice , skPaillierAlice )←$KGen(1λ)
pkPaillierBob
pkPaillierAlice
Fig. 2. Setup phase of the protocol
’decrypt and decode’. Our protocol for one step of the gradient
descent is depicted in Figure 3.
Bob encrypts XT1 X1 using the additive homomorphic cryp-
tosystem with Bob’s public key and sends the encrypted result
to Alice. Using the same key, Alice computes EB(XT2 X2).
Based on additive homomorphic encryption properties, Alice
computes
EB(XTX) = EB(XT1 X1 +XT2 X2)
Similarly Alice encrypts XT2 Y2 and computes:
EB(XTY ) = EB(XT1 Y1 +XT2 Y2)
Next Alice multiplies by plain text θ0 to get the result:
EB(XTXθ0 −XTY )
Alice adds a vector of random numbers to the encrypted result:
EB(XTXθ0 −XTY +RA0 )
Alice sends the result back to Bob. Bob decrypts the result.
Bob knows nothing about Alice’s data since it is masked by
RA0 . Bob computes θ0 − (α/m)(XTXθ0 − XTY + RA0 ) =
θ1− (α/m)RA0 . The result is masked by a random vector RB0
and sent back to Alice. Alice removes −(α/m)RA0 and gets
θ1 +R
B
0 . In this way Alice doesn’t discover θ1 and can’t use
it to recover anything about Bob’s data.
Alice repeats the same procedure as with θ0 resulting in
E(XTXθ1−XTY +XTXRB0 ). The difference is that we get
an additional term XTXRB0 that needs to be removed. Alice
picks a random vector RA1 and add it to the encrypted term
sent to Bob.
Since XTXRB0 = X
T
1 X1R
B
0 + X
T
2 X2R
B
0 , Bob decrypts
and removes XT1 X1R
B
0 . We still need to remove X
T
2 X2R
B
0 .
To this end, Bob and Alice run the sub-protocol in Fig. 4
using Alice’s generated key this time and only three network
messages. The outcome of this sub-protocol is Bob getting
XTXθ1 − XTY masked by random vectors belonging to
Alice. Bob and Alice proceed to compute θ2 at Alice’s side
but masked with another Bob’s random vector. This ends the
first two iterations of our protocol. More iterations can be
performed in the same manner leading to θN + RBN after
N iterations. Each iteration costs five network messages and
simple local computations at both sides. The two parties agree
on revealing θN simply by having the first party publish RBN .
The unknowns of the system for Alice are θN−1, XT1 X1
and XT1 Y1 totaling n
2 + 2n unknowns for only n equations
as determined by the following system:
θN = θN−1− α
m
((XT1 X1+X
T
2 X2)θN−1−(XT1 Y1+XT2 Y2))
The same applies for Bob. Therefore, the leakage is limited
to what can be inferred from a party’s data and the result of
the linear regression solution.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate our protocol for numerical stability since we
are transforming floating point numbers into integers or big
integers and back. We also study the time and communication
cost. The code for a toy example is available at https://github.
com/mnassar/private-two-party-leastsquares.
A. Numerical Stability
In this experiment we study the effect of the scaling factors
s1 and s2 on the relative error in the norm of the solution
θ with respect to the exact solution. Since encryption and
decryption are not lossy, the error is due to the normalization
and denormalization process. For simplicity we take the case
where s1 = s2 = s. We actually have two sources of
errors: the convergence error and the rounding error. Figure
5 shows that the relative total error is tolerable if we choose
good parameters (learning rate, number of required iterations)
coupled with a large enough scaling factor. For N = 50, 000
the relative error is independent of the scaling factor since the
protocol did not have enough time to converge. For all other
experiments, we get a smaller error by increasing the number
of iterations and the scaling factor simultaneously. A relative
error of 10−7 is quite tolerable after 200,000 iterations. This
is comparable to rounding errors that usually accompany any
numerical computations in double precision. These results are
consistent among many real world datasets that we have tried.
Gradient Descent
Bob Alice
XT1 X1, X
T
1 Y1 X
T
2 X2, X
T
2 Y2
EB(XT1 X1), EB(XT1 Y1)
Compute:
EB(XT1 X1 +XT2 X2) = EB(XTX)
EB(XT1 Y1 +XT2 Y2) = EB(XTY )
Pick: RA0
Compute: EB(XTXθ0 −XTY +RA0 )
EB(XTXθ0 −XTY +RA0 )
Decrypt: XTXθ0 −XTY +RA0
Compute:
θ0 − α
m
(XTXθ0 −XTY +RA0 ) =
θ1 − α
m
RA0
Pick: RB0
θ1 − α
m
RA0 +R
B
0
Remove: − α
m
RA0
Obtain: θ1 +RB0 (1)
Compute:
EB(XTXθ1 +XTXRB0 −XTY )
Pick: RA1
EB(XTXθ1 +XTXRB0 −XTY +RA1 )
Decrypt:
XTXθ1 +X
TXRB0 −XTY +RA1 =
XTXθ1 +X
T
1 X1R
B
0 +X
T
2 X2R
B
0 −XTY +RA1
Remove: XT1 X1R
B
0
Obtain:
XTXθ1 +X
T
2 X2R
B
0 −XTY +RA1 (2)
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Obtain: XTXθ1 −XTY +RA1 −RA2
Compute:
θ1 − α
m
RA0 − α
m
(XTXθ1 −XTY +RA1 −RA2 )
= θ2 − α
m
(RA1 −RA2 +RA0 )
θ2 − α
m
(RA1 −RA2 +RA0 ) +RB2
Obtain: θ2 +RB2
Go To (1)
Fig. 3. Protocol for one-step gradient descent
Sub Protocol for removing XT2 X2R
B
0
Bob Alice
EA(XT2 X2)
Compute: EA(XT2 X2RB0 )
Pick: RB1
EA(XT2 X2RB0 +RB1 )
Decrypt : XT2 X2R
B
0 +R
B
1
Pick: RA2
XT2 X2R
B
0 +R
B
1 +R
A
2
Remove: RB1
Obtain: XT2 X2R
B
0 +R
A
2
Subtract from (2) :
XTXθ1 −XTY +RA1 −RA2
Fig. 4. Sub-Protocol for one-step gradient descent
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The reason is that most of the time the elements of the matrix
X does not have a big difference in scale. We do not encounter
numerical instabilities as long as X is not especially crafted
to be ill conditioned.
B. Time Cost
We have implemented a high performance Paillier’s cryp-
tosystem in Python with a GMP C backend (https://github.
com/mnassar/paillier-gmpy2) [20]. Based on our benchmark
of the tool (run on one processor Intel Xeon CPU 2.90GHz
on a Linux server machine), the average time required for each
cryptographic operation are as follows for a key size of 1024
bits:
• Encryption (E): 1000 operations take ∼ 2.1 seconds.
• Decryption (D): 1000 operations take ∼ 1.9 seconds.
• Add plaintext constant to cipher (i.e. an encryption fol-
lowed by a modular multiplication (AC)): 1000 opera-
tions take ∼ 1.9 seconds.
• Multiply number by cipher (i.e. a modular exponentiation
operation (ME)): 1000 operations take ∼ 1.9 seconds.
• Flipping the sign of cipher (a modular multiplicative
inversion (MI)): 10,000 operations take ∼ 0.2 seconds.
• Adding two ciphers (i.e. modular multiplication (MM)):
10,000 operations take ∼ 0.05 seconds.
Each round of the privacy preserving protocol (starting and
ending at (1) in Fig. 3) mainly depends on n and requires:
• Alice time:
1) time to multiply encrypted matrix of size n × n by a
plain text vector of size n =⇒ n2(ME + MM)
2) time to flip the encrypted XTY and add it to the
encrypted result: =⇒ n(MM + MI)
3) time to encrypt a random vector of size n and add it
to the result =⇒ n(E + MM)
4) sub-protocol time: decrypt an n vector =⇒ nD
timeroundAlice ≈ n2(ME + MM) + n(2MM + MI + E + D)
• Bob time
1) decrypt an n vector,
2) sub-protocol time: encrypt an n vector and add to
plaintext vector,
timeroundBob ≈ n(D + E + MM)
Note that we have neglected non-cryptographic operations
time with respect to cryptographic routines time. In addition,
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Crypto time is quadratic in n
N = 5000
Bob time
Alice time
Total time
Fig. 6. Simulation of the total required time of cryptographic routines
we account for the setup time apart from key generation and
parameter negotiation. This time is required only once:
timesetupBob ≡ n2E + n(E + D)
timesetupAlice ≡ n2(ME + 2MM) + n(MI + 3MM)
As shown in Fig. 6, the total time cost of the protocol is:
timetotal = timesetup +N × timeround
C. Communication cost
The protocol requires one round for setup and two rounds
of communications per iteration. The exchanged size is O(n2)
and is independent of m. This is an advantage since in linear
least squares n is usually small and m is large.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extended recent research in private ma-
chine learning and proposed a practical scheme for secure two
party computation of linear regression and linear least squares.
Our protocol is based on a fixed point encoding scheme, and
masking through one-time random pads for hiding intermedi-
ate results. It requires two rounds of communication per step
of gradient descent. We presented numerical experiments and
simulation results. In future work we aim at implementing
our approach with the help of existing secure multi-party
computation languages and libraries. The implementation will
allow comparing to other approaches from the literature in
terms of security, cost and performance. In case where our
approach is revealed superior, we estimate that similar multi-
party private protocols can be developed for linear means
classifier, Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Classifier and linear
perceptrons.
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